Judicial Restraint

In 1973 a lawsuit was filed against Arizona officials in the Department of Education and the Board of Education as well as the State Treasurer and Attorney General claiming "that the system of financing public schools in Arizona is discriminatory because of the disparity of wealth in school districts results in inequality in education for the students, and an unequal burden on taxpayers in the poorer districts."
Shofstall v. Hollins 110 Ariz. 88; 515 P.2d 590; 1973 Ariz. LEXIS 447

The plaintiffs claimed that school finance system was unconstitutional for the reason that it failed to meet constitutional requirements.

Art XI, sec. I of the Arizona Constitution reads in part:
"The legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system,..."
Ariz. Const., art. XI, sec. 6 reads in part:
"The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be established and maintained in every school district for at least six month in each year, which school shall be open to all pupils between the ages of six and twenty-one years."
The Arizona Court held that "the constitution does establish education as a fundamental right of pupils between the ages of six and twenty-one. The constitution, by its provisions, assures to every child a basic education."

The Arizona Court did not find their State system of school financing to be unconstitutional under the equal protection clauses of the United States nor with respect to their constitution.

The Arizona Court held that "A school financing system which meets the educational mandates of our constitution, i.e., uniform, free, available to all persons aged six to twenty-one, and open a minimum of six months per year, need otherwise be only rational, reasonable, and neither discriminatory nor capricious."

In response to the taxpayer-plaintiff contentions, the Arizona Court cited San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodrigues, 93 S.Ct. at 1307-1308 as follows:
"moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an unconstitutional method of providing for education then it may be an equally impermissible means of providing other necessary services customarily financed largely from local property taxes, including local police and fire protection, public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a severe denegration [sic] of local property taxation and control as would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply never been within the constitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify statewide measure of financing public services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens live."
Unlike New Hampshire, the Arizona Court concluded it was not their "constitutional prerogative," i.e. they had no jurisdiction, "to nullify statewide measures of financing public services." The Arizona Court went even further by acknowledging that "[w]e are all aware that the citizens of one county shoulder a different tax burden than the citizens of another and also receive varying degrees of governmental service. The taxpayers of some municipalities have a greater tax burden than the taxpayers of others. We find no magic in the fact that the school district taxes herein complained of are greater in some districts than others."

The New Hampshire Court should take a lesson in judicial restraint from the Arizona Court. Assuming a State duty to provide education may set a precedent which results in a State duty to provide for police, fire, public health, hospitals and public utilities as all are necessary services.






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